under s3 of the 1983 Act 11 and it has also been used in different contexts, such as whether a search warrant was lawfully executed 12 .
The third development has been the growth of challenges by one public law body to the decisions of another public law body, particularly challenges to decisions of Mental Health Review Tribunals by hospitals and after-care authorities. This is a consequence of the need to accord appropriate weight to the fact that a Tribunal is a judicial body which, to comply with Article 5(4) of the Convention, has to have the power to order the release of an unlawfully detained psychiatric patient. The issue of lawfulness here includes the question of whether the merits of the need to detain are made out.
Prior to the Human Rights Act 1998, if the mental health professionals believed that a decision to discharge a patient was wrong, they were able to arrange for the patient to be re-sectioned if they felt that the criteria were met 13 . Indeed the duty to make an application if it were thought appropriate, under s13 of the 1983 Act, could be said to require such an application. However, the situation has had to be revisited pursuant to the duty imposed on the courts under s3 of the 1998 Act to strive to interpret legislation so that it is compatible with Convention rights, which has required that previous authorities be revisited despite the common law's adherence to the doctrine of precedent. The new position is that a Tribunal decision is to be respected and allowed to stand unless it can be shown that there was information of which the Tribunal was not aware which puts a significantly different complexion on the case (such as the patient reneging on an undertaking to take medication or a deterioration in the patient's condition) 14 .
As a result of these developments, the Administrative Court's case load in relation to challenges to the lawfulness of decisions in the mental health context has seen a significant growth.
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Habeas Corpus
One of the other consequences of the growth of judicial review has been a diminution in the use of the remedy of Habeas Corpus, the remedy whereby a challenge to the jurisdiction to detain can be brought in front of the High Court. It was the remedy used in the leading case of Re S-C 16 , which involved a challenge to the right of the hospital to detain someone when the application was fundamentally flawed because the nearest relative objected. However, in B v Barking, Havering and Brentwood Community Healthcare NHS Trust 17 , which involved an allegation that the renewal of detention was fundamentally flawed, a differently constituted Court of Appeal suggested that judicial review should be the remedy sought. It is certainly possible to have judicial review cases heard speedily 18 and the right to seek bail in the course of judicial review proceedings allows a detainee to be released in a short time-scale if the merits are clear. 21 , in which the release of a patient was ordered on the basis that the Crown Court judge had erred in finding that he had the jurisdiction to make a hospital order under s51 of the 1983 Act 22 , which requires that it be "impracticable or inappropriate to bring the detainee before the court". The factual circumstances were that the patient was in the cells of the court, and it was his counsel's request that s51 be invoked: however, the High Court held that the statutory language had to be construed restrictively, requiring a level of disablement such that it was inappropriate for the patient to be brought to court, and the judge had misdirected himself as to the law in using the power. There had been a parallel application for Habeas Corpus in case the time limit rules applicable to judicial review had caused a problem 23 , though this was adjourned when permission to bring the judicial review proceedings was granted with a time extension of just under 4 years 24 .
R (PG) v LB Ealing and
Both Rutty and Kenneally involved what might be seen as procedural prerequisites for detention which were separate from the central medical question of whether the detainee suffered from a mental disorder of the necessary nature or degree. However, there is nothing in principle to prevent the jurisdiction of the High Court from being exercised in this regard. The Court has demonstrated that it is willing to review whether the prerequisites of the jurisdiction to detain are made out, and is willing to enter into the arena of medical disputes. Consequently, the existence of an "unsound mind" of the necessary nature or degree, established by adequate evidence 25 is a matter fit for judicial determination.
Those detained under the civil provisions of s3 of the 1983 Act are the subject of a public law decision which is open to challenge in the High Court; the right to apply to a Mental Health Review Tribunal is not an alternative remedy (it being a principle of judicial review that other avenues of appeal are exhausted first) because the Tribunal considers not the lawfulness of the original detention but the position of the patient at the date it meets. There is the practical fact that it might be possible to have a Tribunal consider the case more quickly than the High Court, which will have to allow time for the relevant medical evidence to be compiled and for the case to be listed. In relation to those detained under a s37 hospital order by the Magistrates Court, there is a right of appeal to the Crown Court in the first instance, which has jurisdiction to examine the merits of the making of an order; the ruling of the Crown Court on appeal can be taken to the High Court. In relation to those detained under s37 by the Crown Court following a trial on indictment, the appeal route is to the Court of Appeal rather than by way of judicial review 26 : the fact that there is a prospect of appeal on the merits supports the contention that the High Court, when it has jurisdiction by way of judicial review, should be willing to examine whether there is proper evidence that a person is of "unsound mind" so as to require detention.
Other Public Law Cases
In addition to the jurisdiction of the High Court in judicial review and habeas corpus cases, mental health practitioners should also be aware of other courts which may take decisions. In particular, the Family Division of the High Court has jurisdiction to make declarations as to the lawfulness or otherwise of treatment plans 27 . It should also be noted that inquests are potentially of much greater significance in instances where there are deaths arising from inadequate care and treatment. Although the rules relating to inquests do not generally allow findings of neglect 28 , the obligations which arise under Article 2 of the European Convention to investigate deaths which have occurred when a person is in the custody of the State mean that it is permissible to return a finding of systemic neglect (as opposed to neglect by an individual) when to do so will allow compliance with this procedural duty under Article 2 and reduce the risks of repetition of a death in similar circumstances: R (Middleton) v HM Coroner 29 .
Private Law -Potential Tort Actions and Damages
Mental health law challenges to the lawfulness of a particular decision may also involve challenges framed in private law. The usual remedy available in such circumstances is a claim for damages, although injunctions to prevent or occasionally compel certain steps may be involved. (An injunction can be granted in judicial review proceedings, which can also include a claim for damages. Proceedings may be transferred from the Administrative Court to the Queen's Bench Division of the High Court once the public law element of the claim has been determined 30 .) 31 . The facts of this case are fairly stark. The prisoner was detained on the basis of an honest sentence calculation which was correct in law until the law was changed in ex p Evans (No 1) 32 , when the cases on which the governor had relied were effectively overruled. Because the legal theory is that the courts determine what the law has always been, in that they do not change the law just from the date of the judgment, the detention became unlawful, albeit retrospectively, and so damages were awarded at a level of £5000 for 59 additional days.
It follows that an action in false imprisonment is a possible consequence of detention in hospital without the cover of lawful authority. In mental health cases, lawful authority is provided by either the Mental Health Act 1983 or common law, so it is necessary to check whether the many requirements of the statute or common law have been complied with. There is scope for argument as to various of the specific requirements, but it should be noted that:
(i) s6 of the Act provides that a "duly completed" application is authority to convey to hospital within a set time and, on admission, is "sufficient authority for the managers to detain the patient in the hospital in accordance with the provisions of this Act". Clearly, it is important that the application is duly completed, though there is an additional safeguard for hospitals in that s6(3) provides that an application which "appears to be duly made and to be founded on the necessary medical recommendations may be acted upon without further proof of the signature or qualification of the person by whom the application or any such medical recommendation is made or given or of any matter of fact or opinion stated in it". There may be scope for argument about whether an apparently duly completed form which is not in fact duly completed amounts to detention "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law" as required by Article 5 of the European Convention 33 . The High Court is able to look behind the apparent due completion and grant habeas corpus if the form is inaccurate 34 .
(ii) An admission order made under the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to Plead) Act 1991 provides authority to convey to the hospital designated by the Home Secretary and to detain. (See also the place of safety powers of the Crown Court under Schedule 1 to the 1991 Act.) A failure to designate the appropriate hospital within the time scale set by the Act, namely 2 months, arguably takes away the jurisdiction to detain.
(iii) See also police powers under s135/136 of the 1983 Act, which have various procedural requirements which ought to be construed strictly as the right to liberty is involved. In addition to the procedural requirements, there is the question of the substantive merits of the detention -ie, is the mental disorder such as to justify detention. The discussion above of the cases of Rutty and Kenneally applies in relation to the question of damages as well: the public law remedy which may result in an order for the release of the patient can be followed by a private law remedy in the form of damages.
The lawful authority to detain must be continuing. At this point, the issue of the merits becomes more important (though there are procedures to be followed, in particular compliance with s20 of the 1983 Act in relation to compulsory but non-restricted patients). For example, in R v Riverside Mental Health Trust ex p Huzzey 36 , an error made by the managers in considering whether to uphold a barring order made under s25 of the Act following an application to discharge by a nearest relative (in that they considered the s3 test rather than the additional dangerousness criterion in s25) rendered false the detention between that time and the patient's release some 12 weeks later on the direction of a Tribunal, which in turn lead a jury to award him £24000 in compensatory damages and £2000 in aggravated damages 37 .
The issue of the merits of detention is usually dealt with by the Mental Health Review Tribunal, and two issues frequently arise. First: if the Tribunal orders discharge and the patient is soon resectioned, is that lawful? As explained above, the answer is basically not unless there has been a change in circumstances 38 .
The second issue is what happens when a Tribunal orders a deferred discharge but conditions are not met, leading to the continued detention of the patient. As it stands, if the impasse is because a professional judgment stands in the way, there is little that can be done in domestic law to force the discharge through: so, when a community responsible medical officer refused to take a patient, the courts did not intervene 39 ; equally, when a social worker would not approve a hostel, the courts did not intervene with what was held to be a rational judgment 40 . There has been a development in the law in that, in relation to the deferred conditional discharge of a restricted patient, the Tribunal is able to be retain supervisory powers over the meeting of conditions and may modify them if it 
